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Constitutionalising Secondary Rules in Global Environmental 
Regimes: Non-Compliance Procedures and the Enforcement 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements Ǧȗ
 
Abstract 
Due to its remarkable success, the model of the Montreal Protocols non-compliance 
procedure (NCP) has been adopted in other environmental regimes, whose primary norms 
differ considerably. Hence, this article distinguishes different types of global environmental 
regimes and assesses the performance of NCPs therein as endogenous enforcement 
mechanisms. In fact, the reciprocal nature of the main conventional obligations in some more 
recent environmental regimes seems to hamper the effectiveness of compliance procedures. 
On this basis, it puts forward some tentative considerations from a constitutional perspective. 
Drawing from the experience gained under environmental regimes in the UNECE region, it 
explores the feasibility of transplanting some aspects of the model of the Aarhus Convention 
NCP into the more complex global context. Further, it reflects upon the potential of enhancing 
synergies between NCPs and national and international judiciaries as a step towards the 
consolidation of international public law in this area. 
 
Keywords: international environmental law, global environmental regimes, non-compliance 
procedures, dispute settlement, constitutionalism, managerialism. 
 
1. Introduction 
International environmental law has been identified as one of the areas of international 
regulation where the consideration and protection of common interests has visibly shaped the 
evolution of that particular field of the international legal order, both from a substantive and 
from an institutional and procedural perspective. In terms of substance on the one hand, the 
identification of issue areas that are perceived to be of common concern of humankind have 
led to the incorporation of principles of inter- and intra-generational equity into global 
environmental law that have profoundly changed the formerly discretionary role of states in 
their mutual relations, towards a more functional role, according to which [s]tates are to act 
in the interest of individuals and groups in society and in the common interest.1 The incipient 
shift from bilateralism towards community interests, which is not unique to the field of global 
environmental law, has also brought about the emergence of new concepts, such as jus cogens 
                                                 
* Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Tarragona (antonio.cardesa@urv.cat). This article is 
an expanded version of a paper presented in the 4th Biennial Conference of the European Society of International 
Law in Cambridge, on 3rd September 2010. It is a result of the research project DER2010-19529/JURI financed 
by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. I am grateful to the JEL editor and to the anonymous 
referees for their insightful comments. I would also like to thank Milagros Álvarez-Verdugo, Antoni Pigrau-
Solé, Yves Le Bouthillier and Rosa Ana Alija-Fernández for their encouragement, support and comments to 
previous drafts of this article. 
1 E Hey, Common Interests and the (Re)constitution of Public Space (2009) 39 Envtl Pol & L 152, 154. 
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or obligations erga omnes.2 In the particular field of international environmental law, the 
traditional principles concerning the use and exploitation of shared resources in the context of 
mutual, bilateral relations of good neighbourhood in classic international law, have been 
complemented by multilateral treaties addressing the protection of global environmental 
goods  the so-called multilateral environmental agreements (hereinafter, MEAs)  which are 
explicitly or implicitly regarded to be of common concern.3 They constitute the multilateral 
contractual source for international obligations, compliance with which is no longer based on 
reciprocity, but is, rather, owed erga omnes partes.4 
On the other hand, from an institutional and procedural perspective, the protection of common 
interests has also encouraged the evolution from the discretion of states towards the discretion 
of global institutions. This means that the capacity of decision-making in both, normative 
development of global environmental law and its implementation in individual situations, is 
being reallocated from states to international institutions, such as the Conferences of the 
Parties (COPs) in MEAs, which are not submitted to the checks and balances associated with 
the exercise of public powers at the national level.5 In this context, moreover, decision-
making patterns that unfolded within the (global) MEAs treaty bodies for the development 
and implementation of the conventional provisions are shifting away from classical 
procedures based on the formal manifestation of consent in response to a general 
acknowledgment of the need for a more dynamic and flexible approach. As Brunnée has 
concluded with respect to this phenomenon, The reliance on COP decisions (...) might 
suggest either that increasingly attenuated consent suffices to produce formally binding 
obligations, or that a pattern of non-binding regulation is emerging.6 Hence, the MEAs 
conventional provisions are more and more implemented through measures of uncertain legal 
value. In sum, these specific features of environmental regimes underpin their notorious trend 
towards autonomy or self-containment  in other words regime-specific enforcement 
solutions  due to the lack of effectiveness of traditional mechanisms of classic international 
law in this field.7 As Fitzmaurice has stressed, this does not mean in any way that 
international environmental law constitutes a special branch or regime separate from the 
mainstream of international law, but that:  
 
special features of the environment as a subject-matter of international law have resulted in 
particular solutions, applications or rules within the general principles of international law which, 
if not necessarily unique to, are at least particularly characteristic of, environmental law.8  
 
Specifically, the Montreal Protocols NCP is seen as an innovative endogenous enforcement 
mechanism that has proven to be quite successful in eliciting compliance among Parties 
experiencing some sort of difficulties in the implementation process. Within a general context 
                                                 
2 S Villalpando, The Legal Dimension of the International Community: How Community Interests Are 
Protected in International Law (2010) 21 EJIL 387, 394. 
3 M Fitzmaurice, International Environmental Law As a Special Field (1994) 25 Netherlands Ybk Intl L 181, 
220-1. 
4 J Brunnée, Common Areas, Common Heritage and Common Concern in D Bodansky, J Brunnée and E Hey 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (OUP 2007) 550, 565-7. 
5 Hey (n 1) 155-8. 
6 J Brunnée, Reweaving the Fabric of International Law? Patterns of Consent in Environmental Framework 
Agreements in R Wolfrum and V Röben (eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty Making (Springer 
2005) 101, 123. 
7 J Klabbers, Compliance Procedures in Bodansky, Brunnée & Hey (n 4) 996, 1000-3. 
8 Fitzmaurice (n 3) 182-3. 
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of what some refer to as a process of commodification of international law9 inspired by a 
managerial mindset,10 it has served as a model for similar enforcement mechanisms in a 
number of global MEAs. Yet, this process of continued development and refinement of such 
non-compliance systems has also been praised as one of the largely untold success stories of 
international environmental law over the last two decades, based on a nuanced, incremental 
response, through intra-treaty innovation, to the existing normative and institutional deficits in 
this particular body of law.11 While this latter assertion certainly reflects the general picture, a 
closer look into the operation and performance of the compliance mechanisms in the various 
regimes reveals a somewhat more differentiated picture. Indeed, the NCP at the Montreal 
Protocol is operating effectively, having accumulated a significant body of case-law. 
However, those mechanisms subsequently adopted in other global MEAs do not necessarily 
show the same record of success. 
Accordingly, this article focuses on the suitability of the Montreal Protocols NCP as a model 
of a mechanism to ensure compliance with and enforcement of global MEAs. It aims to 
elucidate the conditions under which these mechanisms have proven most effective from 
those under which they show significant flaws, thereby contributing to an appraisal of the 
performance of international environmental law in establishing strong and effective legal 
instruments. It is submitted that the disparate record of functionality of NCPs in global MEAs 
is directly linked to the regulatory approaches applied therein and, consequently, to the legal 
nature of the obligations undertaken by the Parties.  
Indeed, especially with respect to their substance, different sets of environmental regimes may 
be distinguished on the basis of the underlying regulatory approaches, in which the Parties 
undertake obligations of a divergent legal nature. Hence, borrowing Harts well-known 
distinction,12 environmental regimes may be classified according to their primary rules 
specific features. To the extent that they move away from classical bilateralist patterns, they 
have also involved the emergence of regime-specific secondary rules,13 by which we refer in 
the present context to what Hart called rules of adjudication, namely those empowering 
individuals to make authoritative determinations of the question whether, on a particular 
occasion, a primary rule has been broken, and also define the procedure to be followed.14 
Yet, the disparate degree of success of NCPs in global MEAs raises the question whether the 
Montreal Protocol model of regime-specific secondary rules actually meets the expectations 
of effectiveness in any kind of environmental regime. Further, the more fundamental question 
arises whether NCPs may be considered of as a manifestation of a process of 
commodification of international law, as Klabbers suggests, by which compliance with 
international obligations in specific cases is left to the discretion of states and international 
institutions,15 or whether on the contrary they contribute to foster anything coming close to 
the rule of law in international environmental law. Put differently, do NCPs promote 
international constitutionalism in the field of international environmental law?  
                                                 
9 J Klabbers, The Commodification of International Law in H Ruiz Fabri, E Jouannet and V Tomkiewicz (eds), 
Select Proceedings of the European Society of International Law: Volume 1 2006 (Hart Publishing 2008) 341, 
349-50. 
10 M Koskenniemi, Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and 
Globalization (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, 13-4. 
11 D French, Finding Autonomy in International Environmental Law and Governance (2009) 21 JEL 255, 283. 
12 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon Law Series, 2nd edn OUP 1961, 1994) ch 5. 
13 See Fitzmaurice (n 3) 223-4. 
14 Hart (n 12) 96-8. 
15 Klabbers (n 9). 
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Constitutionalism has been embraced by legal theorists from many different perspectives. 
However  or precisely for that reason  its content is highly controversial and remains rather 
unclear.16 Koskenniemi tries to grasp the essence of constitutionalism by defining it as a 
mindset, a project of political and moral regeneration, according to which international 
lawyers resort to a vocabulary of institutional hierarchies and fundamental values in the 
application of law, without necessarily being tied to any definite institutional project.17 Some 
authors criticise these attempts as a somewhat indiscriminate translation of concepts forged in 
a socio-historical context dominated by the nation-state to a new, unprecedented reality, 
which is described as post-modern, post-national, pluralism.18 Others in turn see it as one of 
several more recent theoretical approaches to international law that lead to a methodological 
quagmire, by which law-making by scholarship is being justified contrary to any sort of legal 
common sense.19  
Be that as it may, Paulus substantive (rather than formalistic) conception of international 
constitutionalism seems to be particularly appropriate in the present context.20 According to 
this author, to the extent that they are present in international law, principles such as 
democracy, human rights, equality and solidarity, checks and balances, and the rule of law, 
may contribute to a theoretical reconstruction of international law in constitutional terms, in 
order to set up the legal foundation for the allocation of public powers in the international 
sphere, and to submit them to constraint.21 Put differently, such principles provide valuable 
instruments for the development of a body of international public law, in contradistinction to 
public international law, through which to reconfigurate the international public space, 
making international decision-making more legitimate and, as a result, making both states and 
international institutions more accountable.22 
From this perspective, the characteristic features of conventional obligations in global MEAs 
are assessed in the following, by distinguishing different sets of regimes according to their 
underlying regulatory approaches. Against this background, the institutional and procedural 
structure of NCPs in the different sets of regimes and their performance in practice are briefly 
analysed. On this basis, their main weaknesses are appraised, and proposals are put forward to 
enhance their effectiveness. It is submitted that NCPs may increase their performance by 
opening up to public participation, thereby contributing to an increase in the (democratic) 
legitimacy of global environmental governance. Furthermore, it is argued that the 
enhancement of synergies between NCPs and national and international judiciaries may be 
beneficial to the international rule of law, and the consistent interpretation and application of 
international law. Both reflections are thought of as a step towards the constitutionalisation of 
secondary rules in global environmental regimes and the consolidation of an international 
public law in this area.23 
 
                                                 
16 J Klabbers, A Peters and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (OUP 2009) ch 1. 
17 Koskenniemi (n 10) 18. 
18 N Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism. The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (OUP 2010). 
19 J Kammerhofer, Constitutionalism and the Myth of Practical Reason: Kelsenian Responses to Methodological 
Problems (2010) 23 Leiden J Intl L 723. 
20 AL Paulus, The International Legal System as a Constitution in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), Ruling 
the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP 2009) 69. 
21 ibid 90-3. 
22 E Hey, International Public Law (2004) 6 Intl L FORUM du Droit International 149. 
23 Hey (n 22). 
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2. Primary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: Characteristic Features of 
Multilateral Treaty Obligations 
Environmental regimes are typically shaped as dynamic, sectoral legal systems in which a 
MEA sets the foundational legal instrument that establishes the commonly agreed definition 
of the specific environmental problem being addressed, as well as the elementary principles, 
rules and institutions that will serve as a basis for the process of cooperation. These principles 
and rules constitute the backbone of the regime and are typically defined in relatively open 
terms, hence allowing their development in the MEAs institutional settings, as scientific and 
political consensus on the measures necessary to cope with the environmental problem 
evolve.24 Within this legal framework, the measures foreseen in MEAs are applied through 
the use of different regulatory approaches, ranging from direct regulation (command-and-
control) to the use of different kinds of economic instruments, with an increasing trend 
towards a more prominent use of systems of economic incentive.25 Conceived as a far more 
effective means for the internalisation of environmental costs, their implementation by 
national authorities in the quest for sustainable development is encouraged in Principle 16 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,26 as an expression of the 
polluter-pays principle.  
These techniques have also permeated international law. Three types of environmental 
regimes may be distinguished on the basis of the underlying regulatory approaches. In a first 
group of environmental regimes aiming at the protection of the global commons  such as the 
ozone27 and climate change regimes28, and also the persistent organic pollutants regime29  
MEAs establish measures of direct regulation, which are combined with such economic 
incentive systems. These regimes set up global standards, such as the progressive reduction 
and elimination of controlled substances,30 or the quantified limitation or reduction 
commitments of certain emissions,31 whose implementation is to be incentivised through the 
use of various market-based instruments, such as restrictions in trade with controlled 
substances32 or the so-called flexible mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol.33 
In contrast thereto, in a second set of regimes established for the protection of components of 
the global ecosystem that are natural resources under the jurisdiction of States, such as the 
biodiversity34 and desertification regimes,35 the measures envisaged by MEAs enhance the 
                                                 
24 T Gehring, Treaty-Making and Treaty Evolution in Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey (n 4) 467, 473-5. 
25 RB Stewart, Economic Incentives for Environmental Protection: Opportunities and Obstacles in RL Revesz, 
P Sands and RB Stewart (eds), Environmental Law, the Economy, and Sustainable Development (CUP 2000) 
171, 220-7. 
26 UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol 1) (1992), Annex I. 
27 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (22 March 1985) 1513 UNTS 293, (1987) 26 ILM 
1529; Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (16 September 1987) 1522 UNTS 3, 
(1987) 26 ILM 1541. 
28 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (9 May 1992) 1771 UNTS 107, (1992) 31 ILM 
851; Kyoto Protocol (11 December 1997) 2303 UNTS 148, (1998) 37 ILM 22. 
29 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (23 May 2001) 2256 UNTS 119, (2001) 40 ILM 532. 
30 Arts 2 and 2A to 2I in relation with Annexes A, B, C and E Montreal Protocol; arts 3,4 and 6 in relation with 
Annexes A, B and C Stockholm Convention. 
31 Art 3 and Annex B Kyoto Protocol. 
32 Arts 4, 4A and 4B Montreal Protocol; art. 3(2) Stockholm Convention. 
33 Arts 6, 12 and 17 Kyoto Protocol. 
34 Convention on Biological Diversity (5 June 1992) 1760 UNTS 79, (1992) 31 ILM 822; International Treaty on 
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (3 November 2001) 2400 UNTS 379. 
35 Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, particularly in Africa (17 June 1994) 1954 UNTS 3, (1994) 33 ILM 1328. 
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application of principles and duties of general international law36 within their respective 
scopes of application through economic instruments of a more general nature. As developed 
by the 2010 Nagoya Protocol,37 the Convention on Biological Diversity establishes 
instruments for the equitable participation in the benefits and charges derived from the 
utilisation of genetic resources, as a way to incentivise the conservation and sustainable use of 
the components of biological diversity,38 whereas the UN Convention to Combat 
Desertification envisages the sustainable use of soil by offering financial, scientific and 
technical development aid to developing countries. 
A third group of environmental regimes  such as the hazardous wastes,39 the biosafety40 and 
the pesticides41 regimes  specifically regulate international movements of products that pose 
a risk to the environment and human health in a way consistent with the WTO agreements, by 
submitting them to a prior informed consent procedure.42 Complementary thereto, strict 
liability regimes for environmental damage are to be developed as a means to implement the 
polluter-pays principle. However, none of the international legal instruments necessary to put 
them in place is yet in force. The Cartagena Protocols COP-MOP just adopted the Nagoya-
Kuala Lumpur Supplementary Protocol on Liability and Redress in October 2010,43 and the 
1999 Basel Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes has so far failed to obtain the required 
number of ratifications.44 As for the pesticides regime, the Rotterdam Convention does not 
foresee the adoption of liability rules. Efforts made within the Conference of Plenipotentiaries 
to set in motion a process to close this loophole prior to the Conventions entry into force did 
not succeed and were abandoned.45 
The legal analysis of global MEAs reveals a decreasing degree of constitutionalisation of the 
primary rules in the three mentioned types of regimes. The core of the treaty obligations in the 
first group of regimes is certainly of a collective nature. As the problems addressed therein 
affect the global commons and are considered to be a common concern of humankind,46 
Parties to these MEAs have agreed to a combination of direct regulation measures with 
economic instruments. Consequently, these MEAs establish global standards that are binding 
for all Parties, despite the differential treatment accorded to them in view of their diverging 
degree of economic development.47 Parties to these regimes actually undertake obligations 
erga omnes partes, as  paraphrasing Special Rapporteur Crawford in his third report on State 
Responsibility  all States parties have an expressed or necessarily implied common legal 
                                                 
36 Art 3 CBD; Preamble, §15 UNCCD. 
37 COP Decision X/1, Annex I. UN Doc UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 (2011). 
38 The same approach is followed in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture, which is linked both to FAO and the CBD. 
39 Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (22 March 1989)  
1673 UNTS 57, (1989) 28 ILM 649. 
40 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (29 January 2000) 2226 UNTS 
208, (2000) 39 ILM 1027. 
41 Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade (10 September 1998) 2244 UNTS 337, (1999) 38 ILM 1. 
42 See generally C Hilson, Information Disclosure and the Regulation of Traded Product Risks (2005) 17 JEL 
305. 
43 COP-MOP Decision BS-V/11. UN Doc UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/5/17 (2010). 
44  See <http://www.basel.int/ratif/protocol.htm> accessed 27 June 2011. 
45 A Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound 
International Policy or False Comfort? (2003) 12 RECIEL 225, 234-5. 
46 Preamble, §1, UNFCCC. 
47 See generally, L Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (OUP 2006). 
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interest in the maintenance and implementation of the international regime.48 In a merely 
descriptive way, I will henceforth refer to them as collective regimes. MEAs in the second 
set of regimes also address global environmental problems considered to be of common 
concern to humankind.49 However, as they relate to natural resources that are to a great 
extent under State jurisdiction, developed and developing countries have opposed  for 
different reasons  the establishment of direct regulation measures.50 In this second set of 
environmental regimes, MEAs reinstate the principle of sovereignty in their respective scope 
of application, as well as the prevention principle (sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas). 
Hence, these MEAs establish a conventional framework for the application of collective 
obligations arising out of general international law in relation to the sustainable use of the 
natural resources concerned. However, the economic instruments for their application, that 
make the core of the conventional regimes, are bilateral and reciprocal in nature. In the 
following, I will refer to them as mixed regimes. Finally, with respect to the third group of 
regimes, MEAs regulating international movements of hazardous products that pose a risk to 
the environment and human health, also contribute to the protection of the global 
environment. Nevertheless, by regulating transboundary movements of these products 
between specific Parties, the provisions of these treaties are indeed multilateral, but contain a 
bundle of bilateral obligations of a reciprocal nature. For the purpose of this article, I will call 
them bilateralised regimes. 
 
3. Secondary Rules in Global Environmental Regimes: Seeking Endogenous 
Enforcement through NCPs  
Having examined the primary rules in global MEAs, we now shall enter the realm of 
secondary rules, in particular, those concerned with regime-specific enforcement. Academic 
literature generally acknowledges that traditional approaches to international law 
enforcement, such as state responsibility and liability, and adjudicative dispute settlement 
(hereinafter, ADS) do not fully suit the specificity of MEAs. Two main groups of arguments 
are generally put forward to sustain this assertion. First, according to the mainstream 
discourse on this issue, the complexity and dynamism of environmental problems addressed 
in environmental regimes, as well as their inter-related character, demand a holistic, proactive 
approach in their management, rather than classical reactive enforcement mechanisms.51 In 
this context, an intrinsic inability of ADS to cope with the multidimensionality or 
polycentricity of environmental disputes is pointed out.52 On the other hand, as existing 
practice demonstrates, this multidimensionality of international environmental disputes is also 
connected to fragmentation, as States engage in forum shopping, submitting the various 
aspects of the dispute to different available dispute settlement mechanisms that they deem  
most favourable to their claims. Moreover, according to the standard managerialist discourse, 
                                                 
48 Third Report on State Responsibility by Mr. James Crawford, Special Rapporteur. UN Doc A/CN.4/507 
(2000), §106.b. 
49 Preamble, §3, CBD and Preamble, §§1 and 3, UNCCD. 
50 F Burhenne-Guilmin and S Casey-Lefkowitz, The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won Global 
Achievement (1992) 3 Ybk Intl Envtl L 43, 47. 
51 A Chayes, AH Chayes and RB Mitchell, Managing Compliance: A Comparative Perspective in E Brown 
Weiss and HK Jacobson (eds), Engaging Countries. Strengthening Compliance with International 
Environmental Accords (The MIT Press 1998) 39. See also Bodansky, Brunnée & Hey (n 4) 7. 
52 S Ohlhoff, Methoden der Konfliktbewältigung bei grenzüberschreitenden Umweltproblemen im Wandel. 
Überwindung der Grenzen herkömmlicher Streitbeilegung durch systeminterne Flexibilität und systemexterne 
Innovation (Springer 2003) 8-14. This assertion is critically discussed in T Stephens, International Courts and 
Environmental Protection (CUP 2009) 458, 95-102. 
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ADS  at least in its traditional configuration  is too slow and cumbersome to deal 
appropriately with the issues at stake in environmental disputes.53 Finally, the reactive 
approach underlying ADS in ascertaining breaches of or non-compliance with international 
environmental standards is also seen as a disadvantage, as environmental damage is 
frequently irreparable and remedial obligations arising out of state responsibility or liability 
regimes hardly provide for restitution or compensation.54  
Second, deeply related to the problems that arise from the specific features of the problems 
addressed in environmental regimes, the collective, non-reciprocal nature of conventional 
obligations in some, makes it hard to identify any injured or specially affected state as a 
consequence of their breach or non-compliance. In his aforementioned third report on State 
Responsibility, the Special Rapporteur Crawford specifically referred to the obligation arising 
for the parties under the Montreal Protocol not to omit excess CFCs into the atmosphere as an 
example of a purely solidary obligation, where there will never be a demonstrable 
connection with any particular breach and the impact on any particular State party.55 This 
specific feature of collective obligations poses particular difficulties with regard to the 
suspension or termination of the MEAs by any Party individually,56 and to the invocation of 
state responsibility.57  Furthermore, the collective nature of these obligations also raises the 
question of locus standi before international courts. Yet, even if the legal interest of not 
directly affected Parties were to be considered by an international court as sufficient to ground 
their standing, the essentially consensual nature of the jurisdiction of international courts adds 
further difficulties to the matter. Therefore, one may agree with the much quoted assertion by 
Vice-President Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the case concerning the Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project, according to which [i]n addressing such problems, which transcend the 
individual rights and obligations of the litigating states, international law will need to look 
beyond procedural rules fashioned for purely inter partes litigation.58 
Under these circumstances global MEAs have developed endogenous enforcement 
mechanisms, which are similar to those established in other areas of international legal 
regulation for the protection of community interests.59 Based on the model of the procedure 
developed under the Montreal Protocol, these mechanisms follow a managerial approach and 
are conceived of as non-confrontational, non-adversarial mechanisms that do not aim to brand 
a Party as defaulting its obligations or providing for remedies, but rather to elicit Parties 
experiencing problems back into compliance through assistance.60 Designed to induce and 
promote compliance with the treaty obligations, their aim is to avoid the emergence of 
disputes and, thus, the resort to adjudicative settlement. Furthermore, as mechanisms that are 
collectively operated through the MEAs autonomous institutional arrangements, they evade 
                                                 
53 Chayes, Handler Chayes & Mitchell (n 51) 54. 
54 T Scovazzi, State Responsibility for Environmental Harm (2001) 12 Ybk Intl Envtl L 43, 51. See also J 
Brunnée, Of Sense and Sensibility: Reflections on International Liability Regimes as Tools for Environmental 
Protection (2004) 53 ICLQ 351, 364. 
55 UN Doc A/CN.4/507 (2000), §108. 
56 Art 60 (2) and (3) VCLT. See M Fitzmaurice and C Redgwell, Environmental Non-Compliance Procedures 
and International Law (2000) 31 Netherlands Ybk Intl L 35, 59-62, and M Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or 
Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol (1992) 3 Ybk Intl Envtl L 123, 138. 
57 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) (UN Doc A/56/10) 
arts 42 and 48. 
58 Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 118. 
59 See generally, G Ulfstein, T Marauhn and A Zimmermann (eds), Making Treaties Work. Human Rights, 
Environment and Arms Control (CUP 2007). 
60 G Handl, Compliance Control Mechanisms and International Environmental Obligations (1997) 5 Tulane J 
Intl & Comp L 29, 34. 
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the difficult question of the invocation of state responsibility, particularly in the context of 
collective regimes.61 Finally, NCPs are better suited to enforce dynamic environmental 
regimes, in which the basic legally binding treaty-based principles and rules are fleshed out 
through COP decisions, the legal nature of which is not always easily determined.62 
In fact, after the adoption and early success of the Montreal Protocols NCP63- the first of its 
kind - it has served as a model of an endogenous enforcement procedure in other global 
MEAs. So far, similar procedures have been established in the Basel Convention64 and the 
Cartagena Protocol,65 as well as in the Kyoto Protocol66 and, very recently, in the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.67 On the contrary, 
negotiations for the adoption of such a procedure in the Rotterdam68 and Stockholm 
Conventions,69 although quite advanced, are stagnated and those for the adoption of the 
Desertification Conventions NCP are still in their preliminary stages.70 In order to complete 
the picture, the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity also 
provides for such a mechanism,71 and the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations for a 
legally binding global instrument on mercury also seem to envisage a NCP.72  
Where they have been established, NCPs are typically entrusted to small-sized treaty bodies, 
the so called Compliance Committees, which are incorporated in the MEAs autonomous 
institutional arrangements.73 Yet, even if their composition and powers are generally quite 
homogeneous across the different MEAs, a significant distinction can be drawn between such 
Committees, regarding their respective functions, in collective and in bilateralised regimes. 
While the Committees in collective regimes are charged with compliance control functions,74 
those established under bilateralised regimes are further mandated to review general questions 
related to the implementation of and compliance with the conventional provisions.75 
However, this additional, more general function does not amount to the assessment of specific 
compliance issues concerning a Party. Instead, it allows these Committees to identify general 
trends in the overall implementation, in a similar way as the Committee for the Review of the 
Implementation of the Convention does under the desertification regime.76  
                                                 
61 C Nègre, Responsibility and International Environmental Law in J Crawford, A Pellet and S Olleson (eds), 
The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010) 803, 810. 
62 Klabbers (n 7) 1008. 
63 MOP Decision IV/5 and Annexes IV and V. UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15 (1992). 
64 COP Decision VI/12, Appendix. UN Doc UNEP/CHW.6/40 (2003). 
65 COP-MOP Decision BS-I/7, Annex. UN Doc UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/1/15 (2004). 
66 Decision 27/CMP.1, Annex. UN Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3. 
67 GB Resolution 2/2011, Annex. See <itpgrfa.net/International/content/resolution-22011-procedures-and-
operational-mechanisms-promote-compliance-and-address-issues> (last accessed 27 June 2011). 
68 Draft in COP Decision RC-4/7, Annex. UN Doc UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.4/24 (2008). 
69 Draft in COP Decision SC-4/33, Annex. UN Doc UNEP/POPS/COP.4/38 (2009). 
70 The UNCCD Secretariat submitted a first draft to the open-ended ad hoc group of experts during the last 
session of the COP. See UN Doc ICCD/COP(9)/13 (2009), Annex. 
71 Art 30 Nagoya Protocol. 
72 UN Doc UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/INC.2/3 (2010), §17. 
73 R Churchill and G Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law (2000) 94 AJIL 623, 644-7. 
74 Montreal Protocol NCP, §7; Kyoto Protocol NCP, §§IV.4 and V.4-6. 
75 Basel Convention NCP, §§19-21; Cartagena Protocol NCP, §III ; Rotterdam Convention Draft NCP, §§ 18-9 
and 25. Among collective regimes, if its present draft was adopted, only the Stockholm Convention NCP would 
vest its Committee with this function (§ 32). 
76 See its recently revised mandate in UNCCD, COP Decision 11/COP.9, Annex, §I. UN Doc 
ICCD/COP(9)/18/Add.1 (2009). 
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In this general framework, NCPs may be initiated on a Party-to-Party basis. Furthermore, a 
Party that is not able to comply with its commitments despite its best efforts to do so can 
make a self-submission. In addition, the Secretariat (or other entitled treaty body) has powers 
to trigger the procedure in defence of the common interest. However, this latter trigger 
mechanism is only fully recognised in the context of collective regimes based on erga omnes 
partes obligations.77 In bilateralised regimes, the Secretariats triggering-powers are 
materially limited to compliance issues regarding procedural and institutional obligations  
viz, reporting requirements.78 Under the Cartagena Protocols NCP, the Secretariat had no 
such capacity at all. Only very recently, following the process of review set in motion by the 
Protocols Compliance Committee, has some sort of triggering-capacity been accorded to the 
Secretariat, and even to the Committee itself, as it may now consider providing advice or 
adopting assistance measures:  
 
in a situation where a Party fails to submit its national report, or information has been received 
through a national report or the Secretariat, based on information from the Biosafety Clearing-
House, that shows that the Party concerned is faced with difficulties complying () .79 
 
4. Assessing the Performance of NCPs 
Coming now to the crucial point, how have NCPs been performing so far in global MEAs? 
Practice reveals that their respective records are quite disparate in collective and bilateralised 
regimes. On the one hand, NCPs in the Montreal Protocol, and  as the still limited practice of 
its Compliance Committee suggests  that of the Kyoto Protocol, are operating on a regular 
basis and seem to perform effectively. On the other hand, NCPs in the Basel Convention and 
Cartagena Protocol are rarely resorted to.  
Practice in the Montreal Protocols NCP shows that the vast majority of cases submitted to 
the Implementation Committee concern issues of non-compliance by developing states. Cases 
concerning countries with economies in transition have been less frequent and those 
concerning developed countries have been merely testimonial.80 Accordingly, the average 
outcome of the procedure is bespoke technical and financial assistance. Whenever this is the 
case, the Multilateral Fund of the Montreal Protocol and the executing agencies (UNIDO, 
UNEP and UNDP) that are responsible for the implementation of ex ante technical and 
financial assistance to Parties operating under article 5 of the Montreal Protocol, have to 
review their policies with respect to a non-compliant Party in accordance with the 
recommendations of the Implementation Committee and the relevant decisions of the Meeting 
of the Parties.81 On the other hand, the Bureau of the Kyoto Protocols Compliance 
Committee has so far not allocated any compliance issues to its Facilitative Branch. 
                                                 
77 Montreal Protocol NCP, §3; Kyoto Protocol NCP, §VI.1. In the Stockholm Convention Draft NCP, this issue 
is still controversial and subject to negotiation (§17 (c)). 
78 Basel Convention NCP, §9 (c). In the Rotterdam Convention Draft-NCP(§12) and the Draft NCP of the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources (§V.1), this issue continues to be controversial and subject to 
negotiation. 
79 COP-MOP Decision BS-V/1, § 1(b). See above n 43. 
80 In fact, the only developed state so far that has been cautioned by the Meeting of the Parties under item B of 
the Indicative List of Measures was Greece in 2007. However, no assistance measures were provided under the 
institutional arrangements of the Montreal Protocol. See Montreal Protocol, MOP Decision XIX/21, §4. UN Doc 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7 (2007). 
81 Financial and technical assistance to countries with economies in transition has been provided mainly through 
the Global Environmental Fund. L Boisson de Chazournes, Technical and Financial Assistance and 
Compliance: the Interplay in U Beyerlin, PT Stoll and R Wolfrum (eds), Ensuring Compliance with 
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The analysis of the so-called sanctions adopted in the context of the NCPs of the Montreal 
and Kyoto Protocols reveals their rather exceptional character. The unique decisions adopted 
in the middle 1990s by the Montreal Protocols MOP with respect to the non-compliance of 
certain countries with economies in transition  particularly that concerning the Russian 
Federation in 199582  were quite controversial, partly because of the severe trade restrictions 
imposed, which can hardly be qualified as a suspension of rights and privileges under the 
Protocol, according to item C of the Indicative List of Measures of the NCP.83 However, the 
suspension of rights and privileges might appear to be the regular outcome of the decisions of 
the Compliance Committees Enforcement Branch in the Kyoto Protocol, as it has so far 
suspended Greece,84 Croatia85 and Bulgaria86 from participation in the so-called flexible 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, with respect to these cases, doubts have also been expressed as to 
whether these decisions may actually be considered as a suspension of rights and privileges 
under the Kyoto Protocol, or whether the Enforcement Branch in fact restrained itself to 
declaring the non fulfilment of the eligibility criteria to participate in the flexible mechanisms 
under articles 6, 12 and 17 Kyoto Protocol by the Parties concerned.87 Be that as it may, 
practice under the Kyoto Protocol NCP is still too scarce to draw any significant conclusions, 
especially if one considers that the aforementioned cases do not concern compliance with the 
Protocols central obligations. 
The picture varies dramatically in the context of bilateralised regimes. The activity of 
Compliance Committees in this latter set of regimes has been limited to the general 
assessment of the respective MEAs implementation by all the Parties, but no compliance 
control has been undertaken in specific cases concerning a particular country. Established in 
2003, the Committee for Administering the Mechanism for Promoting Implementation and 
Compliance of the Basel Convention has only very recently dealt with specific submissions 
by the Secretariat and by one Party with respect to its own non-compliance. These cases 
mainly concern structural difficulties of developing countries in complying with their 
reporting requirements.88 As for the Compliance Committee of the Cartagena Protocol, so far 
the only attempts to trigger the NCP have been made by NGOs, whose submissions were 
nevertheless rejected, as the Committee considered not to be mandated to consider them under 
its terms of reference. However, no submissions have been made by the Parties since the 
establishment of the NCP in 2004. Due to the short period of time which has elapsed since the 
adoption of  the COP-MOPs decision BS-V/1, no references are available regarding possible 
submissions to the Compliance Committee under the revised triggering-conditions. However, 
it is submitted that the changes introduced are likely to encourage resort to the compliance 
mechanism in the future. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Multilateral Environmental Agreements. A Dialogue Between Practitioners and Academia (Martinus Nijhoff 
2006) 273, 284-6. 
82 Montreal Protocol, MOP Decision VII/18, §8. UN Doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.7/12 (1995). 
83 M Fitzmaurice, Non-Compliance Procedures and the Law of the Treaties in T Treves and others (eds), Non-
Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements 
(TMC Asser Press 2009) 453, 473. 
84 UN Doc CC-2007-1-8/Greece/EB, 17 April 2008. Greece was reinstated in its eligibility to participate in the 
flexible mechanisms later that year (doc. CC-2007-1-13/Greece/EB, 13 November 2008). 
85 UN Doc CC-2009-1-8/Croatia/EB, 26 November 2009. Croatia has announced that it intends to appeal the 
final decision of the Enforcement Branch under §XI.1 Kyoto Protocol NCP (doc. CC-2009-1-9/Croatia/EB, 4 
January 2010). 
86 UN Doc CC-2010-1-8/Bulgaria/EB, 28 June 2010. 
87 Fitzmaurice (n 83) 478-80. 
88 UN Doc UNEP/CHW/CC/8/25 (2011). 
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The preceding analysis demonstrates that NCPs have only offered a more effective alternative 
to traditional approaches to international law enforcement in collective regimes. So far, the 
operation of NCPs in global MEAs shows that they only perform as endogenous enforcement 
mechanisms in this specific type of environmental regime, where Parties undertake 
obligations erga omnes partes. In this context, the COP and the Compliance Committee 
channel the institutionalised collective action of the Parties in order to elicit compliance from 
non-compliant states through bespoke assistance. In this way, they contribute to strengthening 
of the regime by managing a generalised and satisfactory level of compliance, thus protecting 
collective interests of the international community in areas which are of common concern for 
humankind. So far, it remains largely to be seen how NCPs will operate and perform in what 
has previously been described as mixed regimes, such as the ITPGRFA, where collective 
obligations concerning the sustainable use of specific resources are implemented through 
instruments based on reciprocity, such as the material transfer agreements under the regimes 
multilateral system of access and benefit-sharing.89 Yet, the analysis also reveals that NCPs 
do not seem to add as much value to the enforcement of bilateralised regimes, where they do 
not seem to properly foster community interests and promote compliance. Why is this so? 
First, as Fitzmaurice suggested some time ago, the effectiveness of NCPs as centralised, 
regime-specific enforcement mechanisms seems to be intrinsically linked to the collective 
nature of the conventional obligations,90 whereas regimes that set up a bundle of bilateral 
obligations do not meet the ideal conditions under which NCPs attain their optimal 
functionality. Apparently, there is a dissonance between these regimes primary and 
secondary rules. Other than in collective regimes, the injured or specially affected state can 
more easily be identified in case of non-compliance or breach of obligations arising from 
bilateralised regimes. Hence, the conditions to trigger the NCP are similar to those for the 
invocation of state responsibility and of locus standi in available ADS procedures. 
In fact, the capacity to trigger the the NCP varies greatly depending on the legal nature of the 
main obligations. As already seen, in environmental regimes whose central conventional 
obligations are due erga omnes partes, the procedure may be initiated by any Party having 
difficulty with compliance, and by any other Party or entitled treaty body. Here, the 
triggering-capacity of the Parties with respect to another Party and that of the treaty body is 
not submitted to any material limitations, such as the condition of being affected by non-
compliance.91 A similar approach is taken in mixed regimes such as the ITPGRFAs, where 
the only difference  albeit a remarkable one  lies in the treaty body able to trigger the 
procedure. Here it is the regimes political body par excellence, the Governing Body,92 and 
not a more independent one such as the Secretariat, which may refer compliance issues to the 
Committee.93 In the context of collective and mixed regimes, some degree of 
institutionalisation of the common interest seems to have been attained, as the treaty body 
entitled to trigger the procedure may be considered to hold the institutional representation of 
the Parties in the MEA for the protection of their common interest in the due level of 
compliance. 
                                                 
89 Arts 10, 12 and 13 ITPGRFA. 
90 Fitzmaurice (n 3) 224. On this point, even though only considering the Kyoto Protocols NCP, see also J 
Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law. Navigating between European Absolutism and American 
Voluntarism (CUP 2008) 187. 
91 See n 73 above. 
92 This is how art 19 ITPGRFA denominates its plenary decision-making body, which equals the COP in other 
MEAs. 
93 ITPGRFA NCP, § VI.1(c). 
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In contrast, in the context of bilateralised regimes, the capacity to trigger the procedure is 
limited to the Party finding itself in difficulties complying with its obligations and to any 
other Party affected or likely to be affected by non compliance. In some of them, such as the 
NCP of the Basel Convention and the Draft NCP of the Rotterdam Convention, the terms of 
reference also grant triggering-powers to the Secretariat, albeit these are limited to alleged 
cases of non-compliance by the Parties with their reporting obligations. In the Cartagena 
Protocols NCP, the Secretariat had no such powers at all until very recently.94 At best, the 
signs of institutionalisation of the common interest in this latter context are rather weak. 
Practice thus strongly suggests that only in those cases where the Secretariat has full 
triggering-powers do NCPs operate effectively. Moreover, it has been the only way used to 
initiate the procedure, except for a small number of self-submissions in the context of the 
Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention. Furthermore, recent practice indicates that 
Parties actually prefer to handle compliance issues arising in bilateralised regimes through 
negotiations within the MEAs institutional arrangements, or refer them to otherwise more 
effective dispute settlement procedures. Two rather recent examples seem to corroborate this 
assessment.  
The first  to which we shall return later  is the Probo Koala incident, more recently also 
known as the Trafigura case, where toxic and dangerous products and wastes were dumped in 
several sites around Abidjan (Ivory Coast) leading to the loss of human life in several cases 
and to serious consequences for human health and the environment. The products causing 
such damage arrived in August 2006 in a shipment having its origin in the port of 
Amsterdam.95 Interestingly, Ivory Coast did not trigger the Basel Convention NCP, but 
requested assistance from the Conventions Technical Cooperation Trust Fund, under which 
an ad hoc technical commission was established in order to assist that country in the 
assessment of the damage to human health and the environment arising from the dumping.96 
After its in-country visit, the commission found that it was unable, at this stage, to establish 
whether or not the discharging of waste from the Probo Koala constituted illegal 
transboundary movement of hazardous wastes as defined by the Basel Convention, but stated 
that:  
 
[w]ithout prejudging which international body is competent to rule on the case, serious lapses 
ha[d] occurred in the application of the relevant regulations, whether under the Basel Convention, 
the MARPOL Convention or the Bamako Convention on the ban on the Import into Africa and the 
Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within Africa.97 
 
During the eighth meeting of the Basel Conventions COP held while the commission was in 
Ivory Coast, the Parties did not refer the matter to the Compliance Committee either, but 
merely called for countries and stakeholders to provide technical and financial assistance to 
Ivory Coast to implement its emergency plan for the clean up and assessment of the damage 
on the ecosystems, its follow-up, and the investigation to establish responsibilities.98 
Eventually, the Netherlands contributed with 1 million to the fund established by the 
                                                 
94 See n 75 above. 
95 On the factual background of the case and its various ramifications, see A Hindman and R Lefeber, General 
Developments. International/Civil Liability and Compensation (2010) 20 Ybk Intl Envtl L 239, 244-7. 
96 L Pineschi, Non-Compliance and the Law of State Responsibility in Treves and others (n 83) 483, 495. 
97 Report of the Basel Convention Secretariats technical assistance mission to Côte dIvoire (20 November 
20061 December 2006) in the context of decision V/32. UN Doc UNEP/CHW/OEWG/6/2 (2007), Annex, §3 
(d) and (e). 
98 COP decision VIII/1, § 1. UN Doc UNEP/CHW.8/16 (2007). 
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executive director of UNEP under decision VIII/1, without expressly recognising any sort of 
responsibility in the matter.99 
More recently, the incident between Brazil and the UK concerning the illegal shipment of 
hazardous wastes hints in a similar direction. In July 2009, Brazilian port authorities detected 
a significant number of containers with origin in British ports that were mislabelled as 
recyclable plastic while they actually carried hazardous wastes. Brazil immediately informed 
the Secretariat and the UK under article 19 of the Basel Convention of what it deemed to be a 
case of illegal traffic and requested formal consultations. In August Brazil further announced 
its intention to request consultations with the UK at the WTOs Dispute Settlement Body.100 
However, the quick response by British authorities under article 9(2) of the Basel Convention 
allowed them to settle the issue bilaterally. By September that year, most of the containers 
had already been returned to the UK, where enforcement action had been initiated against 
responsible persons.101 Of course, one can raise the point of whether Brazil actually would 
have been entitled to request consultations under the WTOs dispute settlement system, as 
only the UK could voice representations () concerning measures affecting the operation of 
any covered agreement taken within the territory of the former.102 Still, this example  like 
the previous one  strongly suggests that the Basel Convention NCP is not considered by the 
Parties as an effective mechanism at all. Instead, states seem to be desperately looking for 
alternative political or quasi-judicial mechanisms whenever serious problems arise. To the 
current authors knowledge, no similar cases have so far arisen between Parties to the 
Cartagena Protocol. However, a former chairperson of its Compliance Committee has 
expressed his personal opinion according to which Parties may actually prefer to resort to the 
WTO dispute settlement system, rather than to the Protocols NCP ... in cases of serious non-
compliance implicating real economic interests.103 
 
5. Advancing Towards the Constitutionalisation of Secondary Rules in Global 
Environmental Regimes 
In the previous section, the performance of NCPs has been appraised, and structural 
weaknesses have been identified, particularly in bilateralised regimes. Inspired by a 
constitutional mindset,104 in the present section, some thoughts will be put forward on 
possible ways to overcome the difficulties encountered in the operation of compliance 
mechanisms, in order to enhance their effectiveness and embeddedness in international law.  
There are indeed significant sceptical voices about constitutionalism in this particular field of 
the international legal order. According to Bodansky, some prominent features of 
international environmental law, such as the use of politically-oriented non-compliance 
procedures, cut strongly against the concept of constitutionalism,105 as they reflect the states 
                                                 
99 UN Doc UNEP/SBC/BUREAU/8/1/7 (2007), §12. 
100 See ICTSD, Brazil Takes Action over UK Waste Shipment (2009)13 Bridges Trade BioRes 1. 
101 Environmental Agency, Chief Executives Update on Key Topics. Open Board Paper. Item No. 7 (15 
September 2009) 1. 
102 Art 4(2) Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 1869 UNTS 401, (1994) 33 ILM 1226.  
103 V Koester, The Compliance Mechanism of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Development, Adoption, 
Content and First Years of Life (2009) 18 RECIEL 77, 90. 
104 Koskenniemi (n 17). 
105 D Bodansky, Is There an International Environmental Constitution? (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies 565, 579. 
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interest in flexibility, rather than in constitutional constraints.106 Still, it should be 
acknowledged that there are actual and potential elements within NCPs which certainly are 
relevant to an eventual process of constitutionalisation of secondary rules in global 
environmental regimes, so as to submit states and international institutions to the international 
rule of law in the ultimate benefit of individuals,107 and to make global environmental 
governance more participatory and, hence, legitimate.  
 
5.1 Refining the Trigger-Mechanism and the Compliance Bodies Interaction with 
NGOs 
 
A first set of thoughts concerns the refinement of the trigger-mechanism in NCPs and the 
compliance bodies interaction with NGOs. With respect to the procedural ways to refer an 
issue to the compliance mechanism, it seems quite obvious that the effectiveness of NCPs 
could be greatly improved if more powers were given to treaty bodies to act in defence of 
community interests. Arguably, vesting the Secretariat with (materially unlimited) capacity to 
submit compliance issues to Committees under bilateralised regimes would render NCPs 
therein more operational and effective.108 In this manner, the accountability of states before 
international institutions would be improved and, hence, significant progress would be made 
in the constitutionalisation of these regimes, without fundamentally changing the reciprocal 
basis of their primary norms. Admittedly, from a legal perspective, the bilateral structure of 
the treaty obligations in these regimes may underpin states reluctance to confer such powers 
to a treaty body. However, as the reform of the Cartagena Protocols NCP shows,109 this 
should not be regarded as a fundamental obstacle for the attribution of such powers to the 
Secretariat or other relevant body of the MEAs institutional arrangements, in view of the 
non-adversarial character of these mechanisms, and the soft and facilitative nature of its 
outcomes. Yet, contrary to the revision of the Cartagena Protocols compliance mechanism, 
where the Committee  if seized by the Secretariat  can only adopt facilitative measures, the 
predominantly soft approach would also need to be complemented with the possibility of 
adopting hard enforcement measures as a last resort.110 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of NCPs could generally be improved if accreditation 
conditions of NGOs were better regulated, and their interaction with the MEAs institutional 
arrangements along the different stages of the procedure refined. As the experience under the 
Cartagena Protocol NCP suggests, NGOs are potentially dynamic factors that may contribute 
to boosting the operation of compliance mechanisms, not only in regional, but also in global 
environmental regimes. In fact, the design of NCPs established in MEAs adopted in the 
UNECE region actually provides quite interesting insights in this respect from a constitutional 
perspective. Particularly the compliance mechanisms developed under the 1998 Aarhus 
Convention111 and its 2003 Kiev Protocol on Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers,112 as 
                                                 
106 ibid 584. See also Klabbers (n 9). 
107 J Waldron, Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law? (2011) 22 EJIL 315. 
108 This would also apply to the draft NCP of the Rotterdam Convention, where this issue remains under 
consideration (n 78). 
109 See n 75 above. 
110 T Kolari, Constructing Non-Compliance Systems into International Environmental Agreements: A Rise of 
Enforcement Doctrine with Credible Sanctions Needed? (2003) 14 Finnish Ybk Intl L 205. 
111 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters (25 June 1998) 2161 UNTS 447,  (1999)  38 ILM 517. 
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well as the 1999 Protocol on Water and Health to the Helsinki Convention on the Protection 
and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes,113 allow for 
communications from the public, meaning any natural or legal persons, and, in accordance 
with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups.114 In 
allowing its Implementation Committee to act on its own initiative, the 1991 Espoo 
Convention115 also provides for indirect access of NGOs to the NCP.116  
These MEAs are certainly on the cutting edge of the development of public participation 
standards in international environmental law, even if their scope of application so far remains 
largely regional.117 Yet, they share some of the fundamental features of global environmental 
regimes that have been described earlier in the article as collective, as these regional MEAs 
stand for the evolution from the formerly discretionary, towards a more functional role of 
states under international (environmental) law,118 where the relevant rules and standards no 
longer, as in classical international law, have the characteristics of contractual undertakings 
between states () [but] more closely resemble general legislative acts of a public law 
nature.119 Playing a pivotal role among those treaties, the 1998 Aarhus Convention has been 
qualified as a new kind of environmental agreement, the most ambitious venture in 
environmental democracy, and a major step forward in international law.120 By providing 
for access to information, public participation in decision-making procedures and access to 
justice in environmental matters, the Aarhus Convention integrates participatory rights into 
international environmental law, hence reinstating first generation human rights as a way to 
foster respect for a third generation right, namely that of the environment.121 Thus, the 
aforementioned MEAs adopted in the UNECE region actually promote public participation in 
the enforcement of environmental law, both at the national and international level, a fact that 
is, in itself, relevant to constitutionalism.122 
However, too prominent an intervention of NGOs in compliance control also spurs 
considerable amount of anxiety. Governments tend to regard active NGO intervention in 
NCPs as jeopardising these mechanisms cooperative and non-controversial nature. More 
specifically, so the argument goes, allocating triggering powers to NGOs would risk 
overloading the institutional capacities of Compliance Committees. Moreover, at the global 
level, the perception of an over-representation of NGOs from developed countries pursuing a 
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West-centric agenda, further stimulates the opposition of developing countries to their 
participation in compliance procedures.123  
Yet, except perhaps for the latter point, the operation of the Aarhus Convention NCP seems to 
demonstrate that the aforementioned concerns about enhanced NGO involvement in these 
mechanisms are largely unfounded.124 Since 2004, the Aarhus Compliance Committee has 
received fifty nine communications from the public, one Party submission and no referrals at 
all by the Secretariat.125 Out of all submitted communications, forty six have already been 
resolved and only thirteen are pending resolution - this latter figure amounting to the number 
of submissions of 2008 (so far the year in which the Committee received the highest number 
of communications). Interestingly, among all resolved cases, sixteen were rejected as not 
admissible and in 30 cases the Committee was able to reach findings on the merits. As some 
authors have pointed out, these raw data suggest first of all that NGOs do make a careful use 
of the mechanism. But should they fail to do so, the wise and transparent application that the 
Compliance Committee has so far made of admissibility criteria has also prevented any 
situation coming close to an excessive workload.126 
In a similar way, since the adoption of its revised operating rules in 2008,127 the 
Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention has maintained an exchange of 
correspondence with three Parties on the basis of information on alleged situations of non-
compliance that had been provided by NGOs. However, in two of them, the Committee was 
satisfied with the response offered by the States concerned and did not initiate proceedings, 
whereas the third one  regarding the alleged violation of obligations arising for Belarus out 
of articles 2 and 3 of the Espoo Convention in relation with its authorities decision on the 
construction of a nuclear power plant  is still under consideration.128 In this case, the number 
of indirect submissions by NGOs is admittedly fairly low. Furthermore, the Implementation 
Committee would seem to be well-equipped in order to deal effectively and transparently with 
a higher number of cases, filtering out abusive or manifestly ill-founded submissions.129 Yet, 
the fact that the Espoo Convention Committee is composed by governmental representatives 
and not by independent members as in the Aarhus Convention, may also provide space for 
more political instead of purely technical considerations in the Committees decisions in this 
regard. 
Returning to global environmental regimes, authors like Tanzi fear that an overemphasised 
role of non-state actors at the global scene typical of constitutional-cosmopolitan conceptions 
of the international community, bears considerable risks in terms of their legitimacy and 
accountability, and may also discard too easily the lasting importance of state sovereignty.130 
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While these risks have to be acknowledged, it seems undeniable that an enhanced 
participation of public interest NGOs in NCPs  by granting them a quasi-prosecutorial role  
would definitely contribute to increase their effectiveness, thereby fostering the Parties 
accountability as well as the regimes legitimacy.131 At present, only the Kyoto Protocol NCP 
comes close to this, as NGOs  despite lacking triggering-capacity  implicitly may provide 
relevant data to the expert review teams while conducting the in-country visit in the context of 
the review under the Protocols article 8, which may eventually lead to the submission of a 
question of implementation to the Compliance Committee.132 While the transplantation of the 
Aarhus NCP model to the global level may prove to be difficult, the model of the Kyoto 
Protocol may be of particular relevance to other global environmental regimes. By implicitly 
allowing the expert review teams to interact with local NGOs, it seems to be particularly 
respectful and integrative not only of the international and transnational dimensions, but also 
of what Onuma has called the multi-civilisational dimension of the contemporary world.133 
With this in mind, and in the absence of direct capacity to trigger the procedure, a more 
cautious regulation of the accreditation conditions for NGOs would contribute to improving 
their interaction with the MEAs treaty bodies, as it would enhance their legitimacy to act as 
an alternative and complementary source of technical and practical data for the assessment of 
the Parties compliance.134 
 
5.2 Enhancing complementarities with national and international judiciaries 
 
A second set of thoughts on the constitutionalisation of secondary rules in global 
environmental regimes concerns the enhancement of complementarities between NCPs and 
national and international judiciaries. In fact, it is submitted that significant potential for the 
improvement of the NCPs effectiveness in global environmental regimes would lie in 
enhanced coordination (and cooperation) with national and international judiciaries. As 
previously seen, the effectiveness of NCPs as endogenous enforcement mechanisms in 
collective regimes has contributed significantly to provide them with a fairly high degree of 
self-containment. Conversely, weak NCPs under bilateralised regimes seem to be 
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circumvented either in favour of ad hoc solutions, as in the Probo Koala/Trafigura incident, or 
 as Koester has suggested with respect to serious controversies implying compliance issues 
under the Cartagena Protocol  might be referred to exogenous dispute settlement systems 
such as the WTOs. 135 Be that as it may, so far NCPs do not constitute effective endogenous 
enforcement mechanisms in these bilateralised regimes. Bearing in mind that they regulate 
transboundary movements of products posing a risk to human health and the environment, the 
centre of gravity of the compliance control and enforcement functions is thus displaced in a 
very significant proportion from the inter-state level to the national level, where not only the 
administration, but also the judiciary has an increasing role to play.136 As Nollkaemper has 
pointed out, these regimes require the Parties to enact implementing legislation and seek 
enforcement vis-à-vis private parties that act in contravention of the provisions of the 
convention (or, rather, in contravention of the national provisions that give effect to the 
convention).137  
The aforementioned Trafigura case is quite illustrative in this respect. As a matter of fact, 
independently from the action taken by the states concerned and the rest of the Parties in the 
institutional framework of the Basel Convention, this case has involved different 
developments before various national jurisdictions.138 Of particular importance in the present 
context, the District Court of Amsterdam convicted Trafigura in July 2010, ordering the 
payment of 1 million, as it considered that the concealment of the hazardousness of the 
Probo Koala wastes to the port authorities in Amsterdam, and their subsequent exportation to 
an ACP country, violated article 18(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) 259/93, implementing 
the Basel Convention.139 Thereby, the Dutch judiciary has certainly performed international 
control functions by way of what Georges Scelle called functional duplication (dédoublement 
fonctionnel),140 the Netherlands hence acquitting its obligation to take appropriate legal, 
administrative and other measures to implement and enforce the provisions of this 
Convention, including measures to prevent and punish conduct in contravention.141 However, 
does the central role that falls upon national courts in the enforcement of the Basel 
Convention mean that its compliance procedure is completely out of place? It certainly 
corroborates the previous assessment of its inherent weakness. Still, ideally, once triggered 
the NCP would certainly contribute to exert pressure on Parties that may not prove to be as 
willing or capable of taking due enforcement action as the Dutch courts were in the Trafigura 
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case.142 By ascertaining non-compliance with the Convention in specific cases, the Committee 
would not only contribute to clarifying the extent of secondary obligations under general law 
of state responsibility,143 it would also provide national courts with valuable criteria for 
consistent interpretation of national with international law.144 Moreover, in the context of the 
assisting measures that may be adopted in the compliance procedure, a cooperative 
relationship between the Committee and national courts in the collection of evidence 
concerning specific incidents may also be worth exploring. Therefore, an arguable way to 
enhance the effectiveness of the Basel Conventions NCP  and also for that under the 
Cartagena Protocol  could lie in seeking interaction and complementarity with national 
judiciaries, as a way to foster consistency in international public law, and more importantly, 
as a way to strengthen the international rule of law.145 
Nonetheless, coordination between NCPs and internal jurisdictions is highly significant for 
the sake of compliance control not only in bilateralised, but also in the context of collective 
regimes. This has been highlighted particularly with respect to the interaction of domestic and 
international compliance systems under the climate change regime, where the complementary 
economic incentive measures  such as the Kyoto Protocols flexible mechanisms  
potentially concern private parties. As Tabau and Maljean-Dubois have recently pointed out 
with respect to the incorporation of the climate change regimes guidelines concerning the 
flexible mechanisms into EU legislation, the Union has been particularly keen in linking its 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) to the Kyoto system,146 hence allowing the climate 
change regime to impact on private entities directly within the EU-ETS beyond the realm of 
the state.147 In turn, this linkage has brought about a tight interconnection of the system of 
compliance control set up by the EU with the Kyoto Protocols own system, with respect to 
reporting, verification and enforcement.148 
Precisely because of this interconnection between both systems, a clear potential exists for 
conflicting case-law between the Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ certainly considers itself to have exclusive competence over 
any dispute arising between Member States concerning the interpretation and application of 
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EU law, including multilateral treaties to which both the Member States and the EU itself are 
parties (mixed agreements),149 whereas the Kyoto Protocol NCP for its part operates without 
prejudice to other dispute settlement mechanisms.150 Therefore, as the aforementioned 
authors point out, the coordination of domestic (taking the EU as such) and international 
compliance control systems is of vital importance for their consistency and effectiveness.151  
Two sorts of cases exemplify this. Whereas the European Commission fully exerts its 
functions under article 258 TFEU in minor cases concerning non-compliance with formal 
obligations under the EU-ETS152 (viz reporting in this context) by referring them to the ECJ, 
it does not so in cases where available data suggest more substantial issues of non-
compliance. Here, as in the non-compliance issues concerning Greece and Bulgaria, the 
Commission has shown significant self-restraint. Despite sending letters of formal notice to 
the Member State concerned in those cases, thereby initiating the infringement procedure 
under EU law, the Commission refrained from brining the case to the Court before the 
Enforcement Branch of the Kyoto Protocols Compliance Committee had reached its final 
decision, and also thereafter. In these cases, the Protocols NCP was given pre-eminence for 
the sake of consistency between international, European, and arguably also national law. 
Hence, both systems  the international and the European  were able to interact 
constructively. As Tabau and Maljean-Dubois suggest, even if the balance between the two 
courses of action for non-compliance remains fragile, it seems that the two complement one 
another rather than stand in direct competition.153 
The latter example brings us to the last point, namely, the opportunity to further explore and 
enhance the interactions and complementarities of NCPs not only with domestic, but also with 
international courts. As stated above, there are intrinsic factors that may explain the relatively 
scarce referral of international environmental disputes to adjudicative settlement mechanisms, 
even where bilateral or reciprocal obligations are at stake.154 Moreover, where they operate 
effectively, compliance procedures have contributed to this general evolution. Hence, despite 
the increasing number of cases with an environmental dimension that have been recently 
submitted to judicial bodies, the preference of States for allocating compliance control and 
enforcement in global environmental regimes to technical and bureaucratic structures such as 
NCPs, rather than to adjudicatory mechanisms, does not suggest any prospects for change in 
the future  as the continuous efforts in the development of new compliance mechanisms, and 
the refinement of existing ones, suggests. Yet, as Stephens has convincingly argued, in 
contrast to compliance procedures, international courts are more authoritative sites for 
independent decision-making, and therefore are potentially more useful for assisting in the 
principled development of the law. 155 From a constitutional perspective, the question arises 
whether a synergistic interaction between both types of mechanisms may contribute to more 
effective compliance control in global environmental regimes.  
As a matter of fact, the legal relationship between NCPs and ADS is all but clear. 
Nevertheless, despite the absence of practice, scholars would generally agree that they are 
independent, so that resort to one does not rule out simultaneous or subsequent resort to the 
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other.156 Not only do the terms of reference of NCPs typically include a without prejudice-
clause, but the different purpose and object of both kinds of procedures  managing 
compliance issues and regime effectiveness through a cooperative approach, or ascertaining 
the breach of international legal obligations and their legal consequences  also rule out the 
identity of the suit. Moreover, operational NCPs are most often triggered not by one Party 
against another, but by treaty bodies or by a Party with respect to itself. Thus, even in the 
unlikely event of two Parties referring their differences to parallel ongoing non-compliance 
and ADS procedures, neither procedure would preclude the other on the basis of lis pendens. 
Instead, as Treves has pointed out, an opportunity for inter-institutional coordination and 
cooperation would seem to open up. In such a setting, the final decision of the international 
judicial organ would certainly be res judicata for the Compliance Committee and the 
Conference of the Parties to the MEA. Yet, the NCP could well be used as a means to manage 
the enforcement of the international courts ruling. Conversely, prior to its ruling, the non-
binding decisions issued by the Compliance Committee and the Conference of the Parties as a 
result of the NCP may well be taken into consideration by the international judicial organ as 
...subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the 
parties regarding its interpretation.157 Admittedly, these general reflections have a purely 
theoretical value, as there is no practice against which to test them. However, even if such a 
scenario of simultaneous or subsequent resort to NCPs and adjudicatory mechanisms seems 
difficult to imagine, it cannot be excluded, as the previous example concerning parallel 
compliance control under the Kyoto Protocol and EU environmental law demonstrates. 
However, also in that situation there seems to be a potential for a coordinated operation of 
NCPs and adjudicatory mechanisms, as a way to foster consistency in the case-law of the 
different technical, quasi-judicial and judicial bodies in the interpretation and application of 
international (environmental) law.158  
 
6. Conclusion 
Admittedly, drawing from managerialism, NCPs do not amount to judicial review, as one of 
the elements being generally regarded as intrinsic to global constitutionalism. Nevertheless, to 
the extent that traditional adjudicative mechanisms are perceived as unsuitable and very rarely 
resorted to in this particular field, compliance mechanisms are certainly to be regarded as an 
effective alternative to promote and ensure compliance, particularly in areas where primary 
rules are intended to protect collective interests of states. Taking the Montreal Protocol as a 
model of inspiration, NCPs in MEAs have been fine-tuned  with greater or lesser degrees of 
success  to satisfy the enforcement needs arising out of their primary rules specific features 
in each environmental regime. Therefore, their institutional and procedural configurations are 
not uniform, but range from tendentially more diplomatic mechanisms, such as the Montreal 
Protocols, in which the Implementation Committee is composed of representatives of the 
Parties and acts following a fairly informal procedure, to quasi-judicial mechanisms, such as 
the Kyoto Protocols NCP, whose Compliance Committee is consists of independent experts 
and exercises its powers according to a highly formalised procedure.159 Yet, even in the 
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former example, the Implementation Committee does have the mandate to consider 
submissions ... with a view to securing an amicable solution of the matter on the basis of 
respect for the provisions of the Protocol.160  Moreover, as its performance over the past 
twenty years has shown, despite some highly controversial cases in its early phase of 
operation, it has managed to keep a low political profile, by functioning more as a technical 
and administrative, rather than politicised mechanism. The few cases dealt with in the Kyoto 
Protocols Compliance Committee also hint in this direction. In the specific context of what 
this article has called collective regimes, NCPs may be regarded as nuanced, incremental and 
innovative responses to the perceived deficits of traditional bilateralist patterns, which are in 
fact displacing traditional enforcement mechanisms of classic international law.161 In contrast 
thereto, bilateralised regimes actually offer considerable space for traditional approaches to 
their enforcement, which enter into competition with endogenous compliance mechanisms. 
Even more, the relevant practice suggests that state responsibility for the breach of 
international obligations undertaken in these regimes, and the enforcement of its 
implementing legislation through national courts so far seem to be eclipsing NCPs in this 
context.  
On the basis of the preceding assessment, two rather general reflections have been made in 
this article. First, drawing on the experience gained under environmental regimes set up in the 
UNECE region, it has been submitted that opening up compliance mechanisms to public 
participation would contribute to increasing their effectiveness. While the direct translation of 
the model of the Aarhus Conventions NCP into the global context may prove to be difficult, 
practice developed under the Kyoto Protocol compliance system may provide a suitable 
model for other global regimes, as it appears to be particularly respectful not only of the 
international and transnational, but also of the multi-civilisational dimension of  contemporary 
international society. Second, it has been argued that compliance control under global 
environmental regimes would benefit greatly from enhancing complementarities with national 
and international judiciaries. Such coordination between compliance bodies and national and 
international courts would contribute to the international rule of law, allowing the 
international (constitutional) legal order to come to terms with its own heterarchy and 
pluralism, by promoting systemic integrity and the respect for structural, transversal values.162 
These rather general and tentative reflections may be the basis for an eventual attempt of a 
constitutional reconstruction of secondary rules in global environmental regimes, as a way to 
reconfigure the international public space in this particular field, making states and 
international institutions more accountable and, thus, global environmental governance more 
legitimate.163 
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